Abstract
Introduction
In Captains Without Eyes, Lyman Kirkpatrick mentions several possible reasons for the failure of Operation MARKET GARDEN. He comes to the conclusion that poor intelligence was the undoing of the operation. Others disagree, blaming operators for failing to heed valid intelligence and for being too hasty to implement such a daring plan.
A third school of thought suggests that the Germans miraculously recovered just in time to make one last stand at Arnhem, and this recovery was beyond the capability of the intelligence community to predict. Certainly, there are many other factors that contributed to the failure of the operation, to include bad weather, but this paper will focus on the role intelligence played in the failure of MARKET GARDEN.
First, a brief description of the plan is necessary. Three months after the successful Allied amphibious assault at Normandy, German forces had retreated to the Netherlands. On 17 September 1944, the Allies attempted to exploit previous success with the largest airborne operation in history, MARKET GARDEN. The size of the operation was enormous: it included over 5,000 transport aircraft, 2,613 gliders, and almost 5,700 sorties of bombers, fighters and other close air support aircraft. 1 The plan was implemented in the hopes of bringing a swift end to the war against Germany. By early September the collapse of Germany seemed imminent. A much quoted intelligence summary from the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces G-2 expressed the situation in this manner: "The August battles have done it and the enemy in the west has had it. Two and a half months of bitter fighting has brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach." 2 By September, however, one problem remained: the Allied breakout following Normandy had been too successful and the Allies had outrun their logistics tail. 3 Particularly frustrating was the fact that, even though the Allies had 5 Piper, p. 10. "The opportunity to make a swift advance through German defenses to seize operational decisive points such as the Ruhr, Saar and bridges across the Rhine before the German army could regain the initiative was irresistible to Eisenhower. Eisenhower commented after the war that he was willing to wait on all other operations to gain a bridgehead over the Rhine River."
The Plan
The key objective was to gain a bridgehead over the Rhine River. While five of the six bridges were successfully captured, the bridge at Arnhem was not.
Airborne troops could not hold the bridge at Arnhem long enough for armored reinforcements to arrive due to greater than expected German resistance both at Arnhem itself and along the route traveled by 30 th Corps. Most importantly, the operation did not cause a German collapse, as Montgomery had hoped.
2
There are many theories as to why the operation failed. The one most often given is that the operation failed as a result of major intelligence errors, specifically in two areas, a gross underestimation of the enemy and serious misjudgment of the terrain. 3 At face value these concerns sound like failure of the intelligence community to provide adequate information. However, some have made the case that adequate information was available and that this information was overlooked due to euphoria brought on by recent successes.
As the most critical case in point, let us examine intelligence information for the battle at Arnhem. Defeat at Arnhem was in part due to the fact that Allied paratroopers were told to expect light resistance from no more than 2,000 recruits just learning the rudiments of soldiering, when instead the Allies were met by 6,000 battle-hardened veterans, equipped with artillery and tanks. 4 Were intelligence reports about troop strength at Arnhem inaccurate? The answer may be that it depends on which report you chose to believe. Others believe that fostering multiple viewpoints is more prudent. Individuals in this camp believe that no relevant assessments should be suppressed. 14 This approach is more likely to insure that all possible options are represented. The problem, of course, is that this approach demands the operator or commander make the tough choices.
According to Richard K. Betts, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute,
In the best known cases of intelligence failure, the most crucial mistakes have seldom been made by collectors of raw information, occasionally by professionals who produce finished analyses, but most often by the decision makers who consume the products of intelligence services. 15 The key element is appreciation of relevant data. This seems to be the case for those planning MARKET GARDEN at the operational level. Commanders at the operational level had sufficient evidence to merit a serious rethinking of the airborne portion of the operation but chose not to believe this information was worthy of consideration. In fact, the notion that the Germans were a completely beaten enemy incapable of resistance seems to have been a common belief immediately preceding the operation. The Germans seemed ripe for defeat. Consequently, there was an overriding desire to implement the plan as rapidly as possible for several reasons.
First, both Montgomery and Eisenhower were anxious to test airborne operations before the war came to an abrupt end. According to MG Robert Urquhart's biographer, John Baynes,
At the beginning of September, commanders at all levels from Eisenhower down were talking of the war being over before Christmas. For that to happen without having ever made full use of the airborne force, to whose creation so much expense and effort had been devoted, was unthinkable. 16 To some extent it could be argued that previously cancelled airborne operations had been contrived for the sake of using airborne troops as much as to achieve some tactical or operational goal.
Second, Montgomery wanted to secure for Britain the honor of dealing Germany the final blow. This is understandable given the fact that Britain had been fighting the Germans for years before the US entered the war. But the situation became more urgent once Patton's forces successfully broke out of Normandy. Indeed, one source claimed that "Montgomery was chagrined by the spectacular successes of Patton, and was seeking, contrary to his reputation for caution, a British masterstroke to end the war." 17 In fact, during one interview Eisenhower stated that Montgomery was intent on personally ensuring "that the Americans received no credit for their part in the war effort." There is another reason unrelated to terrain for the fact that the Arnhem drop zone was so far from the bridge. The potential problem was the high concentration of flak around the bridge. In fact, according to MG Urquhart's biographer, John Baynes, this concern was the primary reason for not dropping troops closer to the bridge, not soft terrain. 22 Here again, from the broader perspective, this concern is not consistent with
Montgomery's belief that the Germans would not put up much of a fight. Certainly, Montgomery as the overall commander could have ordered the airlift forces to use the closer drop zone, especially given the relative importance of securing the bridge.
Lyman Kirkpatrick believes that the most costly mistake, beyond misjudging the nature of the terrain at Arnhem or even miscalculating Germany's will to fight, was the assumption that 30 th Corps could advance appropriately along the very limited road network between the Belgian border and Arnhem. 23 The terrain between the first bridge across the Meuse canal and Arnhem was a patchwork of polder land, dikes, elevated roadways, and easily defended waterways. Because of these waterways, the texture of the soil, and innumerable drainage ditches and dikes, a vehicular column would be roadbound for a majority of the approach to Arnhem. Perhaps the most striking feature of the terrain is the extent and density of the vegetation. Almost every path and road is lined on either side by trees. Trees or large bushes top almost every field and every dike. The result during spring, summer and early fall is severe restriction of observation. 24 On this issue the Dutch clearly should have been consulted. From the moment Dutch generals learned of the route that Horrocks' 30 th Corps columns proposed to take, they had anxiously tried to dissuade anyone who would listen, warning of the dangers of using exposed dike roads. "In our military staff colleges," Bernard says, "we had run countless studies on the problem. We knew tanks simply could not operate along these roads without infantry." 25 General Horrocks, himself, was uneasy about the plan. In fact, in his biography, he gives the indication that he was well aware of the tough terrain, claiming that "the terrain made the desert seem like child's play." 26 Furthermore, Horrocks states there was only one road on which to make their approach, giving the impression that no alternate routes were considered. This would confirm Prince Bernhard's claim that the Dutch were never consulted on this important issue. Determining the best avenue of approach, based on terrain and all other factors, would have come under the purview of the intelligence community. In this instance, it seems that lack of complete intelligence did extremely hinder operation MARKET GARDEN.
Notes

Conclusion
It is unfair to say that intelligence oversights and mistakes led to the failure of MARKET GARDEN for several reasons. First of all, it is not true that intelligence failed to paint an accurate picture of German troop strength and capability. The correct information was available along with accurate analysis. True, not all intelligence summaries agreed, but there was enough of a disagreement to warrant more investigation and certainly greater caution. Secondly, it is not true that failure to accurately assess the terrain around Arnhem caused the Allies to pick drop zones six to eight miles from the bridge. In fact, terrain was only a minor issue. Furthermore, on this issue Montgomery was inconsistent. If the German troop strength was deemed too weak to challenge ground forces, then why wasn't it deemed too weak to challenge airlift assets?
The one instance that is clearly an intelligence failure was the lack of coordination with Dutch forces about alternate routes to Arnhem. However, this in itself did not cause MARKET GARDEN to fail. To the intelligence community's credit, they did accurately describe the difficult nature of the route that 30 th Corps was to take.
If blame must be assigned, responsibility for MARKET GARDEN's failure can be given to planners at the strategic and operational levels who seemed hell-bent on carrying out the operation for at least two reasons. First, there was an ever-increasing
